Gender-based discrimination is a pervasive and costly phenomenon. To a greater or lesser extent, all economies present a gender wage gap, associated with lower female labor force participation rates and higher fertility. This paper presents a growth model where saving, fertility and labor market participation are endogenously determined, and there is wage discrimination. The model is calibrated to mimic the performance of the U.S. economy, including the gender * This paper has benefited from the financial support fromÉgide and Nova Forum at Universidade 1 wage gap and relative female labor force participation. We then compute the output cost of an increase in discrimination, to find that a 50 percent increase in the gender wage gap leads to a decrease in income per capita of a quarter of the original output. We then compile independent estimates of the female to male earnings ratio for a wide cross-section of countries to construct a new economy, in line with the benchmark U.S. economy, except for the degree of discrimination. We compare the level of output per capita predicted by this model economy with the actual output per capita for each country. Higher discrimination leads to lower output per capita for two reasons: a direct decrease in female labor market participation and an indirect effect through an increase in fertility. We find that for several countries a large fraction of the actual difference in output per capita between the U.S. and the different economies is due to gender inequality. For countries such as Ireland and Saudi Arabia, wage discrimination actually explains all of the output difference with the U.S.
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Introduction
It is widely recognized that gender discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon. It is also a costly phenomenon, though macroeconomic estimates of its cost are rare, and seldom model-based. Everywhere females find it more difficulty than males to access market activities, political power, or health and education inputs. As mentioned in Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2006) , "no country in the world has yet reached equality between women and men in critical areas such economic participation, education, health, and political empowerment." Gender discrimination has many guises, probably interrelated in their causes and consequences, as they are part of a complex system of social, cultural and economic determinants. The economics literature has studied the microeconomics of job and wage discrimination in some detail, thus far focusing on the individual cost of discrimination. We believe it is important to provide a model-based macroeconomic estimate of the cost of wage discrimination and that is the goal of this paper.
Providing an estimate of the cost of discrimination to aggregate output is important for several reasons. First, gender discrimination is largely determined by social and cultural characteristics at the national level that hardly change in the short run.
1
Many of the determinants of discrimination are thus exogenous from the perspective of the economy, suggesting the possibility of ascertaining the aggregate costs of discrimination.
2 Second, the pervasiveness of discrimination across economies implies that aggregate costs are sizable and should be easily captured by aggregate models of the economy. Third, an aggregate model will be able to capture costs of gender discrimination related to indirect, but important, effects such as the impact on fertility, and assess the relative importance of the former with the direct cost of the mere lower participation of women.
3 In fact, this is consistent with cross country empirical evidence, as we will discuss below and as is shown in Figure 1 . Panel (a) of this figure
shows that there is a negative correlation between gender inequality and output per capita and panel (b) reports a positive correlation between gender inequality and fertility. This last correlation will be a key feature of our model economy.
The social sciences literature has uncovered several important relationships between economy, culture, and gender discrimination. Income per capita is associated with lower degrees of discrimination against women, as suggested in Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) . The latter also finds that education is related to lower degrees of discrimination. Fernández (2007) highlight the importance of cultural characteristics as a determinant of female labor force participation, while the empirical results in Algan and Cahuc (2007) point to national family characteristics as a determinant of female participation 4 . In addition, Dollar and Gatti (1999) show that gender inequality is explained to a considerable extent by religiosity, regional factors, and civil freedom. Antecol (2003) focuses on male attitudes toward mothers working outside their home as a determinant of participation, an emphasis that proves productive in the work of Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) , which
show that men whose mothers worked while they were growing up tend to marry 3 In this paper participation and fertility are substitutes in women's time. The Economist (2007) presents data for some countries where higher male to female wage gaps are associated with lower rather than higher fertility. This is due to a third factor that we ignore here, the availability of child care, present in the model developed by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2006) , where women "finance" their time in the market by voting for higher taxes and public services. working women. This is evidence of "preference transmission".
5 Other researchers have also emphasized how the party system validates or not traditional values (see Sainsbury (1999) ). Among the cultural factors that explain female labor force participation, religious affiliation seems to be especially important. Empirical estimates from Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1989) suggest that indicators of religious affiliation explains about a third of the variability in female participation rates across ninety countries. Knudsen and Waerness (1999) relate an index of attitudes toward gender roles with mother's employment in three countries and confirm that "religiously devoted individuals are more negative towards modern gender roles". 6 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) investigate the role of religion and other factors on both economic attitudes and attitudes toward women. They find that while education and income favor more liberal attitudes toward women, all religions discourage such attitudes. 7 Heineck (2004) also uncovers a relationship between religious affiliation and participation and the adoption of the "male-breadwinner gender role model". Siaroff (1994) and Schmidt (1993) suggest a difference between Protestants and Catholics, with the former giving more emphasis to individual autonomy and encouraging female participation. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) suggest that Islam tends to be more discouraging of active female economic roles. Read (2003) re-interprets the correlation between Muslim affiliation and attitudes toward women, suggesting that, in his study, "Muslim respondents are more gender traditional than their non-Muslim peers, but rather than reflecting the impact of religious affiliation per se, this study finds that differences in ethnicity and religiosity are more significant". 8 Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1989) conclude that Muslims, Hindi, and Roman Catholics are the religious affiliations which are associated with lower female participation rate.
9
The second motivation to study the aggregate cost of gender discrimination is the (2005) study the national origins of migrants and conclude that "women whose parents were born in countries where women participated less in the workforce tend to work less themselves."
7 The authors suggest that this effect is mostly the result of association with the dominant religion in the country. Del Boca and Locatelli (2006) confirm the results on education and attitudes toward women.
8 Read (2004) confirms these results, namely the importance of religiosity rather than religious affiliation in explaining attitudes toward working women. The population studied is Arab-Americans, comprising both Muslim and Christian, with a substantial variation in religiosity levels. Moreover, religiosity seems to be the determinant of participation only for the case of women with children present in the home.
9 These authors argue that "the regression coefficients on the Muslim, Hindu and Catholic religions were negative and highly significant. They implied that religion reduced the female labor force participation rate by more than half in Muslim countries, by 40 percent in Hindu countries, and by 30 percent in Catholic countries." sparsity of model-based macroeconomic estimates. An exception is Dollar and Gatti (1999) , who use four gender inequality measures and conclude that there exists a positive empirical relationship between gender equality and per capita income. This is also the case in Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2006) , who report evidence of a negative correlation between gender discrimination in four areas and both output per capita and an index of country competitiveness. Klasen (1999) introduces a very interesting view of gender inequality and growth, considering that inequality is a distortionary tax that leads to a misallocation of education resources, which could affect economic growth through a lower quality of human capital. 10 Blackden and Bhanu (1999) found that gender inequality may have an impact on economic growth through the limit of women's ability to accumulate capital, that is, not only human capital, but also directly productive assets and social capital. Young (1995) found that the rise in female labor force participation accounted for between 0.6 and 1.6 percent of annual per capita growth in the four East Asian tiger economies, giving rise to a controversy on the relative role of productivity and factor inputs as explanations for economic growth.
11 Gümbel (2004) relates three indicators of inequality -in health, in education and in employment -on economic growth and finds that it is differences in gender employment that most explain differences in per capita income growth.
Quantitatively, Daly (2007) , an economist at Goldman Sachs, argues that reduction in barriers to female labor force participation would increase America's GDP by 9%.
He arrives at this figure by rasing women's employment to the same level as men's 10 The author states that "artificial barriers to female employment in the formal sector may contribute to higher labor costs and lower international competitiveness, as woman are effectively prevented from offering their labor services at more competitive wages." Dollar and Gatti (1999) also suggest that gender inequality in education is particularly harmful for economic growth.
11 An alternative view is exploited by Seguino (2000) , who tries to explain the growth rate of export by a series of variables, including the gender wage gap, and finds that a larger gap has a positive effect on exports. Another main finding of this study was that wage differential boosts investment.
Both results, which contradict most of the literature, may be explained by the fact that women have less human capital, though the author partly corrects for this effect.
and assuming that GDP rises in proportion to employment.
As seen above, there is substantial evidence of the influence of "exogenous" factors as determinants of discrimination. The estimates on the macroeconomic cost of discrimination, though generally pointing to a significant cost, are not heretofore based on a macroeconomic model and can thus benefit from an integrated theoretical and empirical approach.
12 Finally, as we pointed above, the lack of a clearer strategy to model the aggregate economy leads to severe problems in assessing the relative impact on output of concurring channels of causation from discrimination to individual behavior. Our paper intends to provide a contribution that is relevant in all three aspects.
The Model
In this section we develop a model to study the cost of gender discrimination to output similar to those in Galor and Weil (1996) and Cavalcanti and Tavares (2006) .
Our strategy is to use a simple growth model with endogenous fertility and female labor market participation to assess the costs of gender discrimination.
Women and Men
Our economy is made up of men and women who live for three periods. In the first period, as children, women and men are indistinguishable, do not make any specific decision, and "consume" a fraction of their parents' time endowment, our 12 An exception is Lagerlöf (2003) The novelty relative to macroeconomic models of fertility and labor market participation is the introduction of gender discrimination. We consider that there are barriers to female labor market participation in the form of wage discrimination.
14 If we take w m t to be the mental labor wage rate, women receive the fraction φ < 1 of this wage rate and a lower φ represents a more discriminatory society.
15 Our model delivers two facts that are borne out by available evidence: the existence of a gender wage gap and its tendency to decrease over time as income per capita increases.
Technology
The production technology uses capital, K t , mental labor, L m t , and physical labor, L p t , to produce output, Y t , according to a constant returns to scale production function. More specifically,
where A t = (1 + µ) t , B > 0, and α ∈ (0, 1). While physical labor is a substitute for physical capital, mental labor is a complement. Thus, physical labor will lose importance as the economy accumulates physical capital and its compensation will deteriorate in relative terms. Parameter µ ≥ 0 corresponds to the rate of technical progress. Given the technology and input prices, the representative firm chooses inputs so that profits are maximized. 16 The first order conditions associated with the representative firm's problem are:
The wage of physical labor does not depend on capital accumulation, while the wage of mental labor increases with capital accumulation. Therefore, female labor in the United States. Lagerlöf (2003) , instead, sets up a growth model where gender differences arise endogenously in equilibrium through a coordination process. His idea is that girls may need less education because they are expected to marry a man, who in general may be better educated. The decrease in fertility might improve gender equality as women's human capital becomes more equal to that of men. Related to this article is the model presented by Falcao and Soares (2007) where increases in female labor force participation and reductions in the gender wage gap are the output of reductions in fertility and in mortality rates.
16 Output is taken as the numeraire.
force participation increases as the relative wage of mental labor increases and, concomitantly, the gender wage gap decreases. As the economy accumulates capital, the opportunity cost of staying at home increases
Preferences
As suggested above, couples draw utility from consumption in their second and third period of life and from the number of children. Let n t be the number of children born at period t, 17 and c t and d t+1 be the consumption of a couple in their second and third period of life, respectively. Preferences are represented by
where β is the subjective discount factor and γ represents the relative weight of children in the couple's utility function. Let h t be the time that parents devote to raising children. In the spirit of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), we assume that children are costly because they consume time resources according to the equation
Solving (6) for h t gives the time cost for a couple that decides to have n t children
Budget Constraints
Notice that the opportunity cost of raising children is greater for a man, (w p t +w m t ), than for a woman, φw m t , φ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if h t ≤ 1, only the wife will spend time raising children. In the case where h t > 1 both will raise children, but the husband will also work some time in the market.
18 The couple's budget constraints for each of the two cases are:
where s t represents savings and the right-hand side shows net income of the couple.
In the last period of life, consumption by the couple satisfies
Couples choose the level of consumption c t , the number of children n t , and savings, s t , so as to maximize (5) subject to (7) to (10). The fertility decision satisfies
From the expressions above, a necessary condition for women to participate in the labor market is that
This assumption is equivalent to γ ≤ (1+β), which is a restriction on the "altruism factor" that "weighs" the benefits of having children against consumption. If the above condition is satisfied, the time spent raising children is given by
and private savings are given by
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, demand equals supply in all markets. In the market for mental . Then, using the input market equilibrium conditions, equations (2) and (3), into (13), yields
Proposition 1: Let assumption 1 be satisfied. Then female hours of work in the market increase with capital accumulation,k t , and decrease with labor market discrimination (low φ).
Proof: See Appendix A ∇.
Equation (16) determines h t as an implicit function ofk t , ψ(k t , φ), and a critical valuek * (φ) such that
and ψ(k t , φ) ∈ (0, 1] ∀k t ≥k * (φ). As a consequence, time devoted to home activities decreases with capital accumulation. Observe that when barriers to female labor force participation are high (φ is low), women work fewer hours in the market. Since fertility is an increasing function of hours at home, the number of children decreases with capital accumulation and increases with gender discrimination in the form of barriers to female labor force participation. (2003) is also a decrease in the quantity of children as discrimination decreases.
The condition that equilibrates the capital market is
Using equations (13), (14), and (15) yields:
Equation (19) defines a non-linear difference equationk t+1 = ξ(k t , φ), wherê
Proposition 2: Let assumption 1 be satisfied. Then there exists at least one locally stable positive steady-state equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B ∇.
Proposition 2 states that a positive and locally stable steady-state exists. However, here, as in Galor and Weil (1996) , one cannot guarantee that the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Measurement: Replicating a Baseline Economy
In this section we provide a first empirical assessment of the cost of gender discrimination by choosing parameter values for our model economy so that it mimics some key statistics of the United States economy. The model period in our economy is taken to be 25 years. Therefore, each agent lives about 75 years. The capital share α is set to 0.40, consistent with Gollin (2002) .
According to Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) , the annual growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) in the United States was 1.41 percent between 1900 and 1948 and jumped to about 1.68 percent between 1948 and 1974. 20 In our model, we set the parameter µ such that the rate of TFP growth in the sector where labor is complementary to capital (i.e., mental labor sector ) is equal to 1.5 percent.
21
We set β such that the agents´subjective discount rate is 4% per year, similar to the risk free yearly real interest rate in the United States in the post war period, as shown in Parente and Prescott (2000) . The altruism factor, γ, is calibrated so that the population is constant in the long-run equilibrium. We set the values of the remaining four parameters -k 0 , B, φ, and D-so that we approach four empirical observations for the U.S. . This implies that µ (1 − α) × 1.5% = 0.9%. Recall also that a model period corresponds to 25 years. Therefore, A t = ((1 + µ) 25 ) t .
times higher than its level in 1900.
23 Goldin (1990) shows that in 1900 the average employed female earned about 48 percent of the average employed male.
24 According to Goldin (2006) , the female to male earnings ratio in 2000 was about 0.75. that the number of hours per woman in home production decreased by 40 percent from 1900 to 2000. 28 Our model thus underestimates the reduction in the number of hours spent by women in home activities over the development process. However, we highlight that in our model, as in Galor and Weil (1996) , the driving force in the reduction of time spent in home activities is the decrease in the gender wage gap.
29 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the baseline economy, represented by the solid line. The graph on the left describes the evolution of the capital stock, withk t+1 on the y axis andk t on the x axis, and the steady state is found where this line is crossed by the 45 degree line. Simulations with the baseline parameter values show that there is a unique steady-state equilibrium fork t >k * . The graph on the right shows the mechanics of the increase in women´s hours worked: as capital is accumulated, the gender wage gap narrows; this increases the opportunity cost of staying at home, decreases fertility, and increases female labor market participation. The dotted line in both graphs describes an economy with a female to male earnings ratio in 2000 of 60 percent instead of 75 percent, as in the baseline economy. Observe that, in this case, the capital per unit of efficiency couple is lower and women work fewer hours in the market. In the following section we exploit these "cross-section" changes further.
28 According to Ramey and Francis (2006) , women spent on average about 50 hours per week in home activities in 1900, compared with about 30 hours per week in 2000.
29 As argued by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) , there are other factors, such as technical progress in the home sector, that are important in accounting for the reduction in hours of housework. In fact, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2007) show that a decrease in the relative price of home appliances has a first order effect in female labor force participation. See also Albanesi and
Olivetti (2007), who argue that improved medical knowledge and the provision of an effective breastmilk substitute favored women's participation in the market. In the current paper we abstract from technical progress in the home sector, so we underestimate the reduction of hours in home production. Table 2 shows that as gender discrimination in labor market activities increases, the level of per capita output decreases, and both the gender wage gap and hours spent 
30
It is very important to highlight that as barriers to female labor market participation increase (that is, φ decreases), there are two channels through which per capita output decreases. 31 First, output per capita decreases because women work fewer hours in the market (h t decreases), and so output decreases for the same population.
Second, output per capita also decreases because discrimination discourages female labor market participation and decreases the couple´s total income, leading couples to choose to have more children, that is, increase n t . 32 What is the relative quantitative importance of the two effects in the overall impact of discrimination.
30 1 − h t can be interpreted as the fraction of the female population that participates in labor market activities in a homogeneous couple setup.
31 Per capita output in this model is given by:
. The first term in the denominator corresponds to the number of existing children, the second term is the number of young couples, and the third term is the number of elderly couples. 32 In our model, as discrimination limits utility gains through female participation and higher consumption, couples opt for increases in utility through fertility. This effect also accounts, in a larger model, for the lower opportunity cost of time spent at home, which is reflected in the decision to have more children.
In the last column of Table 2 we present results for output per capita in the baseline economy when fertility is kept constant. We have solved a standard overlapping generations economy without fertility in which we feed exogenous values of h t into the model as observed in each previous experiment. In this case, we are isolating the first channel through which gender discrimination affects output per capita, that is, the effect working solely though number of hours worked by women.
33 When the female to male earnings ratio decreases by a factor of two, output per capita, in the constant fertility case, decreases by 22.77 percentage points, compared to 42.23
percentage points in the first column. 34 The effect of discrimination through women´s hours at work accounts for about 54 percent of the total reduction in output observed in the model with endogenous fertility. It is noticeable how both effects are of similar magnitude.
5 Measurement: Counterfactual Analysis
The exercises in the previous section describe the quantitative properties of the model for systematic variations in gender discrimination through wage discrimination. We now feed the model with independent estimates of the gender wage gap. As Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) have shown, total wage differential between men and women can be decomposed into an explained part due to differences in characteristics and an unexplained residual ("gender discrimination"). Clearly, for our purpose, 33 We can infer the role of fertility in the output decrease as the difference between the first and the last column.
the correct data is to use cross countries measure of the unexplained residual. However, such data are not readily available for a high number of countries. From our knowledge, the best available source is Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) , that provides a quantitative review of a vast amount of empirical literature on the gender wage gap. Most of the estimates available are from the 1980s and 1990s, and the examined period changes considerably across countries, which is a problem given that, as the authors note, the gender wage gap has decreased across time. In addition, and more importantly, almost all Middle-Eastern economies, some noticeable for high levels of gender discrimination, are absent from the sample. Lastly, the authors unveil a strong positive correlation between the gender wage gap and the unexplained residual, which suggests that the relative discrimination costs across countries we will compute would remain substantially unaltered were we to obtain consistent estimates of the gender wage residual across countries.
36
We therefore use independent estimates of the female to male earnings ratio for several economies, keeping the other parameters, as in the baseline economy, at the U.S. level. United States can be accounted for by differences in gender inequality in pay. In effect, we conduct this exercise for a large sample of countries. For each country, we feed in an independent estimate of gender wage inequality and compare the model's predictions with the relevant country data. We keep all parameters at their baseline values, except parameter φ, which we adjust until the female to male earnings ratio is similar to what is observed in the data. Table 3 reports the results.
We find that when fertility is endogenous, gender wage discrimination explains a large fraction of the difference in output per capita between any of these countries and in the data. This is expected given that we focus only on barriers to female labor force participation and abstract from all other differences among countries, such as T F P differences, labor market institutions, and government policies, etc. 39 We also abstract from the effects of gender discrimination on human capital, working through a decrease in young girls'access to education, which is also expected to be considerable. employment rates were raised to the same level as men's; and suppose that GDP rose in proportion with employment. Then America's GDP would be 9% higher, the euro zone's would be 13% more, and Japan's would be boosted by 16%."
39 These, as shown by Hall and Jones (1999) for T F P and by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is straightforward. We present a simple model of growth with endogenous fertility and endogenous labor market participation that allows us to provide a macroeconomic estimate of the output costs of gender discrimination.
By choosing parameter values that bring our baseline economy close to the actual U.S. economy we find that the output cost of gender discrimination is sizeable. This decrease in output per capita can reach 43 percent of the current U.S. level, were the U.S. to approach the level of gender wage inequality present in, say, Egypt. This estimate is reached changing only the level of gender wage inequality in the U.S. and maintaining all other parameters, including productivity. This decrease in output per capita due to wage discrimination stems from both a decrease in female labor market participation and an increase in fertility, with the first channel slightly more important quantitatively. A counterfactual exercise using 118 developing and developed countries shows that, as expected, our simple model underestimates the difference in output per capita with the U.S. economy. However, as is clearly demonstrated, our parsimonious model shows that a large fraction of country differences in output per capita can be attributed to gender inequality, and for countries such as Ireland and Saudi Arabia, wage discrimination may explain all of the output difference. Therefore, many countries may substantial better use of their workforce and increase output per capita by discouraging gender discrimination in the labor market.
We consider the relationship between gender discrimination and output to be of utmost importance and think that further research should concentrate on two different issues. The first is how distinct mechanisms of gender discrimination -say, bias against participation versus wage discrimination -affect output. The second is the relationship between gender discrimination and human capital, in particular how curtailment of girls' education affects overall human capital and output in a dynamic setting.
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A Proof of Proposition 1 Equation (16) defines h t = ψ(k t , φ). When h t = 1, we have that ψ i (k t , φ) = 0. For h t < 1, and using the implicit function theorem, yields:
Clearly, ψ 2 (k t , φ) < 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Equation (19) defines a non-linear difference equationk t+1 = ξ(k t , φ). As in Galor and Weil (1996) , it is clear that ξ(·, φ) is continuous, and whenk t <k * , we have that
Therefore,
[(1 − α)αk Moreover, clearly lim kt→0 ξ 1 (k t , φ) = ∞.
When k t > k * , then
From (21), we have that |k t ∂ht ∂kt | < (2 − h t ), which implies that ξ 1 (k t , φ) > 0 for k t > k * . In addition, limk t→∞ ξ 1 (k t , φ) = 0. Therefore, a positive and locally stable steady-statek = ξ(k, φ) exists.
The market production function is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas func-
where L t represents the labor input in production, A t = (1 + µ) t , and α ∈ (0, 1).
In equilibrium, we have that capital evolves according to:
In this case there exists a unique and globally stable steady-state level of capital per unit of efficient couple. Again cross-country differences in gender inequality will have two effects on long-run output: (i) one through its direct effect on labor participation;
and (ii) another through its impact on fertility. Observe, however, that contrary to the model of Section 2, the present model generates gender wage inequality and fertility rates that are constant over time. Table 4 , part I, provides all parameter values as well as a note on how each one was obtained. The calibration exercises use the same statistics that were used in the previous model. Now, we do not have to calibrate parameter B, but we have to calibrate parameter θ, which is the relative productivity of men in child raising activities. Observe, however, that for any θ ∈ (0, 1), only women will spend some time at home. Therefore θ can take any value in the (0, 1) interval.
We again explore how the equilibrium properties of the model change with gender discrimination, measured by the female to male earnings ratio. Table 5 shows that results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 2 . A decrease in φ by a factor of two decreases output per capita by approximately 39 when fertility is endogenous, and by roughly 20 percent when fertility is exogenous. Recall that this same exercise using the model of Section 2 yielded the following reductions in output per capita (see Table 2 ): 42.3 and 22.77 percent for the case of endogenous and exogenous fertility, respectively. 
